Mike Macdonald did the most un-Pete Carroll thing for the Seahawks in Week 4

The Seattle Seahawks suffered their first loss of the Mike Macdonald era in Week 4 on Monday night, as the Lions lit up the scoreboard in a 42-29 defeat in Detroit. For the Seahawks, it was a night to forget defensively, as the starting unit was down five starters, which eventually increased to six when safety Julian Love exited the game with a leg injury.

It's hard to blame coach Macdonald solely for the defense's struggles, given the total lack of talent he had at his disposal, but one coaching decision had Seahawks fans scratching their heads.

Trailing 14-28 with 3:00 left in the third quarter, Seattle drove all the way down the field in a gutsy gotta-have-it drive that culminated in a one-yard Kenneth Walker III touchdown run. With those six points, Seattle trailed 20-28. Instead of sending Jason Myers out for a routine extra point try to cut the Detroit lead to seven, Macdonald kept his offense on the field to attempt a two-point conversion.

Why did Seahawks head coach Mike Macdonald go for 2 in the second half of Week 4?

Ultimately, the attempt failed due to officiating incompetence as DK Metcalf, upon review, was very in-bounds despite the call on the field. The officiating is a different story for a different day (it was horrific). The end result was Seattle only came away with six points and the deficit was only cut to eight points, meaning Seattle would need a defensive stop, a touchdown, and a successful two-point conversion to eventually tie the game. So, as many fans are thinking, what was Mike Macdonald thinking?

It all boils down to analytics

Personally, I have opinions on this topic. Going for two after scoring when down by 14 is a controversial topic in the football-verse. I have always been a proponent of going for two in those situations. It's more of a new-age analytics decision than just being aggressive.

The logic is this: League-wide, the likelihood of converting a two-point attempt is nearly 50/50. ESPN did the math to back up this logic back in 2018.

If a team down by 14 does everything right -- scores a touchdown, makes the extra point, gets a defensive stop, scores another touchdown, and makes the second extra point, the game is tied. Logically, in a tie game, there's a 50 percent chance to win and a 50 percent chance to lose. If you're happy with those odds, great!

However, if a team is down by 14 and scores a touchdown to cut the lead to eight, then goes for two and converts, they reduce the lead to six, and a defensive stop followed by a touchdown and subsequent extra point gives that team a one-point lead with, obviously, a higher than 50/50 chance to win the game.

Now, if that same team fails the two-point conversion on the first touchdown, the league-wide likelihood of converting a two-point conversion is 50/50, remember? So, if that team fails the first two-point conversion, the analytics say there's a decent chance they'll convert the second one. And they'll need to.

So, even if you fail the first two-point conversion, you can still tie the game with the second two-point conversion. And statistically, the worst-case scenario is that the game will be tied, which happens to be the best-case scenario if you attempt two extra-point field goals.

In essence, Seattle and Mike Macdonald chose to go for two because of the best-case scenario -- they take the lead by one point if they score again. Worst case scenario, given that two-point tries, are 50/50 by analytics and data, the Seahawks end up tying the game by converting one of the two two-point tries. Macdonald wasn't being ultra-aggressive, and the decision to go for two ultimately didn't even affect the outcome of the game, but here's how it could have played out.

Ken Walker scores the touchdown in the third quarter, shrinking Detroit's lead to just eight. Seattle goes for two to cut the lead to six. Now, there are two possible scenarios with equal odds. The first one is the Seahawks convert the two-point try, trail by six, get a defensive stop, score again, and take the lead with an extra point.

That scenario, in which Seattle takes the lead has a 50/50 chance of happening. The second scenario is the Seahawks fail the two-point conversion, get a defensive stop, score again, then convert the second two-point conversion to tie the game. The third scenario, in which they miss both two-point conversions and lose, is pretty unlikely.

The circumstances matter

The odds of failing two straight two-point conversions are about 26 percent, according to the analytics. But even if Seattle does miss both two-point conversions, they're still in about as good a spot as they would have been had they tied the game with two extra points. That sounds insane but think about it. The goal for Macdonald and Seattle was to sneak out of Detroit with a win. Over half of the defensive starters are out, Jared Goff is looking unstoppable, and that Detroit crowd was rocking. Do you really want to go to overtime?

Seattle wanted to win that game in regulation and leave a coin toss out of it. No part of that Seahawks team wanted overtime. So, back to the scenarios. Had Seattle scored two touchdowns and made both extra points, the game would have been tied, and Seattle would have needed a third possession to win the game. Conversely, had Seattle scored two touchdowns and missed both two-point conversions, they'd still need that third possession to win the game in regulation.

The bottom line is that while the decision ended up moot on Monday night, it is nice to have an analytically-driven head coach who does what makes sense. Seattle went for it on 4th and short on the opening drive in the second half deep in their own territory, a decision Pete Carroll would have never made. That 4th down attempt was successful, and it paid dividends.

At the end of the day, these decisions will start to matter as the season progresses, and having a head coach who is not painfully conservative and can read the room and make decisions based on the circumstances will be incredibly refreshing.